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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jacob Lee Lundahl appeals from the district court's order denying his Rule 35
motion. On appeal, he argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied his due process
rights when it denied his motion to augment the record, and that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Lundahl with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.4647.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement in which the state agreed to limit its sentencing

recommendations, Lundahl pled guilty to the charge. (Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.18; p.11,
Ls.14-16.) The district court entered judgment, imposed a unified sentence of seven
years with two years fixed, and suspended Lundahl's driver's license for an absolute
period of five years. (R., pp.63-66.) The district court suspended the execution of the
prison sentence and placed Lundahl on probation for seven years, but warned him,
if you are caught driving, I will guarantee that I'll revoke your probation and
send you to prison, because you're not going to drive now for five years
and you're not going to drive because your [sic] compliant with the court's
order or you are not going to drive because you're locked in a cage.
(Tr., p.35, L.23 - p.36, L.4; see also R., pp.64-66.)
The following year, the state alleged that Lundahl violated the terms of his
probation. (R., pp.71-72.) Lundahl admitted that he violated his probation by driving
without a license and consuming alcohol. (R., pp.72, 86.) Good to its word, the district
court revoked Lundahl's probation, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.91-92.) After the
period of retained jurisdiction, having received NICl's recommendation that it relinquish
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jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and executed Lundahl's underlying
sentence.

(R., pp.97-98.)

Lundahl filed a subsequent Rule 35 motion requesting

leniency (R., pp.1 00, 105-11), which the district court denied (R., pp.114-15).
Lundahl timely appealed only from the district court's denial of his Rule 35
motion. (R., pp.126-28.)
Pending appeal, Lundahl's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the
settled record with transcripts from the July 13, 2010 probation violation hearing and the
August 31, 2010 probation disposition hearing. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter "Motion to Augment"),
filed July 9, 2012.) The state objected to Lundahl's motion to augment. (Objection to
Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed July 11, 2012.) The
Idaho Supreme Court denied Lundahl's request for the transcripts.

(Order Denying

Motion to Augment and to Suspend The Briefing Schedule (hereinafter "Order Denying
Motion to Augment"), filed July 26,2012.)
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ISSUES
Lundahl states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Lundahl due process and
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested
transcript?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction?
3.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Lundahl's I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Lundahl failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with an
irrelevant transcript?
2.
Lundahl's appeal is not timely from the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction. Does this Court therefore lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of
Lundahl's appeal as it relates to that order?
3.
Has Lundahl failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Lundahl's Claim That His Due Process Or Equal Protection Rights Were Violated By
The Denial Of His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Irrelevant Transcripts
Lacks Merit
A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Lundahl filed a motion to augment the

record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of the July 13, 2010 probation violation
hearing and the August 31, 2010 probation disposition hearing. (Motion to Augment.)
The Idaho Supreme Court denied Lundahl's motion to augment. (Order Denying Motion
to Augment.)
Lundahl now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and denied him effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, ppA-17.) Lundahl's argument is
without merit. First, if this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Lundahl has failed
to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho Supreme Court's order
denying his motion.

Alternatively, on the merits, due process and equal protection

require the state only to provide a record sufficient for appellate review of the errors
alleged. Because the denied transcripts are not relevant to, much less necessary for,
appellate review of the district court's order denying Lundahl's Rule 35 motion (the only
issue over which this Court has jurisdiction), Lundahl has failed to show any error in the
Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his motion to augment.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of

deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Lundahl Has Failed To
Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho Supreme Court's
Order Denying His Motion To Augment
In State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, 2012 Op. No. 38 (Ct. App. July 10,2012),

the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the
appellant his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the record on
appeal with various transcripts.

In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to

review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion
made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that
the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other
law." Morgan at 3. Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to
the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision
and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court."

~

The Court, however, "deem[ed] it

within [its] authority ... to evaluate and rule on [a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the
completed appellant's brief and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for additional
records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a renewed
motion."

~

To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Lundahl's
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arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho Supreme
Court's order denying his motion to augment the record with transcripts that are
unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.

D.

In The Alternative, Lundahl Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement
To The Requested Augmentation
Even if this Court considers the merits of Lundahl's claim, all of his arguments

fail.

As in Morgan, Lundahl argues that he is entitled to the additional transcripts

because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a violation of his constitutional rights
to due process, equal protection, and the effective assistance of appellate counsel.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-17.) This is not "new information or justification for [Lundahl's]
motion to augment the record." See Morgan at 3. Even if it were, his arguments still
lack merit.
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is sufficient
for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below."
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citations omitted). The
state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal."
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial
record that are germane to consideration of the appeal") (internal citations omitted). To
demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show that any
omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson,
92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968). To show prejudice, Lundahl "must
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present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a
fair appeaL" Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002).
Lundahl's appeal is timely only from the district court's November 14, 2011 order
denying his Rule 35 motion.

(See R., p.126 (appeal filed on December 23, 2011).)

Lundahl argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet
unprepared transcripts of his July 13, 2010 probation violation hearing and the August
31, 2010 probation disposition hearing (Appellant's brief, ppA-17), but he has failed to
explain, much less demonstrate, how the transcripts of those hearings are necessary to
decide the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no
evidence that the district court had those transcripts in front of it when it denied his Rule
35 motion, nor is there any indication that the court relied upon anything said at the
previous hearings as a basis for its decision to deny his Rule 35 motion. Because the
as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to the district court in relation to
Lundahl's motion for sentence reconsideration, they were never part of the record
before the district court and are not properly considered for the first time on appeal.
See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972,974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in
rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to
review of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never
before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988
(Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and
consider new evidence."). Lundahl has failed to show how the requested transcripts are
relevant to any issue raised on appeal.
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Lundahl relies on the Court of Appeals' statement from State v. Hanington, 148
Idaho 26,28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is
ordered into execution fol/owing a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation."

(Appellant's brief, p.12.) According to

Lundahl, this language from Hanington requires augmentation with transcripts of all
hearings from sentencing to the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.1214.) The Court in Morgan, however, held that this interpretation of Hanington is too
broad.

Morgan at 4.

The Court clarified that although it "will not arbitrarily confine

[itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the revocation of
probation ... that does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and
including sentencing are germane."

kL.

(emphasis original).

Rather, the Court will

simply consider the portions of the record before the trial court which are relevant to the
ultimate issue on appeal, in this case, the denial of Lundahl's Rule 35 motion.

kL.

Lundahl also relies on State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20, 843 P.2d 170 (Ct. App.
1992), as "[f]urther support" for his position. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) Lundahl's
reliance on Warren is misplaced.

Warren was placed on probation following an

aggravated battery conviction. Warren, 123 Idaho at 21,843 P.2d at 171. Two years
later, Warren was charged with a new crime and his probation was revoked in his
aggravated battery case, but his sentence was reduced.
Warren filed a Rule 35 motion, which was denied.

kL.

kL.

Despite the reduction,

On appeal, Warren challenged

the denial of his Rule 35 motion in the aggravated battery case.

In addressing this

claim, the Court of Appeals noted the absence of either a presentence report or a
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transcript from the sentencing hearing in the aggravated battery case and concluded
that "[w]ithout a more complete record and no argument by Warren as to why the
sentence was unreasonable," there was no support for Warren's claim that the district
court abused its discretion in relation to the sentence reduction or the denial of Rule 35
relief. Id.
Lundahl argues that Warren supports his position that he is entitled to the
requested transcripts because their lack "functions as a procedural bar to the review of
Mr. Lundahl's appellate sentencing claims on the merits," (Appellant's brief, p.14.) This
argument reflects either a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding of Warren as the
Court in Warren clearly addressed the sentencing claim before it, but affirmed due to
the lack of a "more complete record" or "argument by Warren as to why the sentence
was unreasonable." Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Lundahl also claims
"the Warren opinion indicates that [the lack of transcripts] would be presumed to support
the district court's decision to execute the original sentence." (Appellant's brief, p.14.)
However, nothing in Warren suggests that the absence of irrelevant transcripts would
be presumed to support the district court's opinion in this case.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Lundahl also claims that if
he can make a "colorable argument" that he needs "items" to complete a record, the
state must "prove that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal."
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) Mayer does not support this argument. Mayer was convicted on
non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and he appealed, challenging the
sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

19.: at 190.

The appellate court denied his request for a trial transcript at government expense on
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the basis of a local rule providing that verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be
provided at government expense only for felonies.

!sL at 191-93. The issue was not

whether Mayer was entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a
verbatim transcript of his trial.

!sL at 193. The Court noted

it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that the
government need not provide transcripts that were not "germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances."

Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary to
assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the defendant with
resources to pay his own way."

!sL at 195. "Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as

in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the
State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an
effective appeal on those grounds."

!sL

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must establish
- that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

!sL at 194. Only after

the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is established and a
colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant will the burden shift to
the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some record other than a verbatim
transcript will be adequate.

!sL at 194-95. See also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S.

226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether a requested record is necessary, the Court
should consider the "value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the
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appeal," but the standard does not require "a showing of need tailored to the facts of the
particular case" and the Court may take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Lundahl's appeal is timely only from the district court's order denying his Rule 35
motion. The record related to that order is complete. Lundahl has failed to establish
that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to
review the court's order. Nothing in the record suggests that the transcripts Lundahl
requested in his augmentation were before the district court in relation to the denial of
his motion. Because Lundahl failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable
need for the requested transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the
evidence before the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for
appellate review, and Lundahl has failed to establish a violation of his due process
rights. 1 See Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Lundahl also argues that the denial of his request to augment the record on
appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. The Court in Morgan
rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of all transcripts
the appellant desires, stating:
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. Morgan was
afforded the opportunity to designate not only the standard clerk's record,
but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on
appeal. He had time to review the record and make any objections,
corrections, additions, or deletions prior to settling of the record, pursuant
to I.A.R. 29(a). Morgan's failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho
1 As a component of his due process claim, Lundahl also argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcript has deprived him of effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) Because Lundahl has
failed to show that the requested transcript is necessary, or even relevant, for appellate
review of the district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion, there is no possibility that
the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Lundahl of effective assistance of
counsel on this appeal.
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Appellate Rules, and his failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts
in his motion to augment the record, precluded him from including the first
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's motion
to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, indigent or
otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested.
Morgan at 5. Lundahl's equal protection claim fails for the same reasons.
While Lundahl acknowledges that Morgan "does directly deal with the issues
raised in this appeal," he argues, "at this point this case is not final." (Appellant's brief,
pp.11-12.) Although Morgan is not yet final, it is nevertheless very persuasive authority
that Lundahl's claims lack merit.
Lundahl is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the district court's
order denying his Rule 35 motion and nothing more. He has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are relevant to appellate review, much less necessary for
adequate appellate review.

Having failed to make any such showing, his motion to

augment the record with irrelevant transcripts that were never before the district court is
properly denied.

Having failed to show his due process and equal protection rights

were implicated, much less violated, by that denial, Lundahl has failed to show any
basis for relief.

II.
Lundahl's Appeal Of The District Court's Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction Is Untimely

A.

Introduction
On appeal, Lundahl asserts that the district court abused its discretion by

relinquishing jurisdiction in his case. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.) Lundahl, however,
did not timely appeal from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. Because
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Lundahl failed to timely appeal from the order, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
this claim and it must be dismissed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any

time, and over which appel/ate courts exercise free review." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho
755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004).

C.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Consider Lundahl's Untimely Appeal From The
District Court's Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction
The Idaho Appel/ate Rules govern the time and manner in which appeals to the

Idaho Supreme Court are to be filed. With respect to appeals from the district court,
I.AR. 14(a) requires an appeal of "any judgment, order or decree of the district court
appealable as a matter of right" to be filed within 42 days of the date "from the date
evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court." A timely filed notice of appeal is
a prerequisite to appel/ate jurisdiction. I.AR. 21; State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305,306,
246 P.3d 958, 959 (2010) (citation omitted). The failure to file a notice of appeal within
the time limits prescribed by the appel/ate rules requires "automatic dismissal" of the
appeal. I.AR. 21; Ciccone, 150 Idaho at 306,246 P.3d at 959.
Lundahl asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction over his case.

(Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.)

The district court's order

relinquishing jurisdiction was entered on June 22, 2011. (R., p.97.) Lundahl filed his
notice of appeal more than six months later on December 23, 2011.

(R., p.126.)

Because Lundahl failed to file his notice of appeal within the time limits prescribed by
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the appellate rules, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this claim and it must be
dismissed.
Even had Lundahl timely appealed the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction, his arguments would still fail. Whether to grant probation "is a matter left to
the sound discretion of the court."

I.C. § 19-2601 (4).

The decision to relinquish

jurisdiction is also a matter of discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639
P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203,205-06,786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App.
1990).

A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of

discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended
sentence and probation would be inappropriate. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194,
687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). The district court had sufficient information in this
case to determine that reinstating Lundahl on probation would be inappropriate,
especially considering his poor performance during the period of retained jurisdiction.
(See APSI.) Lundahl has therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

III.
Lundahl Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion By Denying His Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
Lundahl asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by denying

his Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-21.) Lundahl has
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838,
840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Lundahl must "show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion."

C.

kl

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion By Denying Lundahl's
Rule 35 Motion
While the district court was presented with new information between its initial

sentencing and the ultimate denial of Lundahl's Rule 35 motion, none of it reflected
positively on Lundahl.

Originally, Lundahl was convicted and sentenced on a felony

DUI. (R., pp.63-66.) As noted by the district court in its order denying Lundahl's Rule
35 motion, "[t]he Court considered that probation was appropriate initially." (R., p.115.)
While placing Lundahl on probation, the district court specifically warned him,
if you are caught driving, I will guarantee that "" revoke your probation and
send you to prison, because you're not going to drive now for five years
and you're not going to drive because your [sic] compliant with the court's
order or you are not going to drive because you're locked in a cage.
(Tr., p.35, L.23 - p.36, L.4.)

In less than a year, Lundahl violated his probation by

driving without a license and drinking alcohol. (R., pp.72, 86.)
"However, when [Lundahl] violated his probation the Court believed that a period
of retained jurisdiction would enhance the likelihood that [he] would be successful on
probation." (R., p.115.) Lundahl initially was successful, advancing to level 3 in the
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therapeutic community, but then he began to go downhill.

(APSI, p.2.)

Before

completing the therapeutic community, Lundahl demanded that his programming be
terminated. (APSI, p.3.) Ultimately, NICI recommended that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction because Lundahl "would not take responsibility for his behavior after
numerous interventions," "he did not want to complete the [therapeutic community]
program," and he "presented himself as unwilling to correct his criminal core beliefs."
(APSI, p.4.)
On appeal, Lundahl asserts that he was placed on several medications and it
took awhile before he was stabilized on them. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) Lundahl
contends that the medications made him agitated and frustrated, but that he performed
much better once he stabilized. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) Contrary to Lundahl's claims
on appeal, however, the district court did not use "I DOC's failure to adequately stabilize
Mr. Lundahl ... against him." (Id.)

Rather, the district court relinquished jurisdiction

because Lundahl "failed to complete the rider program." (Tr., p.52, L.21 - p.53, L.1.)
Lundahl's medications did not cause him to refuse to complete the therapeutic
community, especially since that refusal came at the end of his period of retained
jurisdiction, long after he was "stabilized."
Lundahl was not amenable to probation, a fact acknowledged by his defense
counsel. (See Tr., p.47, L.18.) Lundahl failed during his period of retained jurisdiction
because he would not complete his programming. (APSI, pp.3-4.) Lundahl's sentence
was reasonable when imposed and remains so in light of the new information
subsequently provided to the district court. Lundahl has failed to establish an abuse of
the district court's sentencing discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Lundahl's Rule 35 motion.
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